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Waiting for the
Investment Boom?
It Might Be a While
S
ome economists believe that the 2001 recession
ended in the fourth quarter of 2001 (see the inside
cover of this publication). Since then, real business
fixed investment (BFI)—expenditures on structures and
equipment and software—has declined at a 2.2 percent
annual rate. By contrast, in the first four quarters of the
typical recovery, real BFI increases a little more than 8
percent. 
One reason why growth of real BFI has remained weak
is that real GDP growth during the recovery has been
weaker than normal, which is probably related to the
mildness of the 2001 recession. Geopolitical uncertainties
arising from the conflict with Iraq and tensions with North
Korea may be another reason why business investment
spending has been unusually weak. According to this argu-
ment, firms have been postponing plans for new capital
projects until the risks become clearer. Indeed, in the
policy statement issued after the March 18 Federal Open
Market Committee meeting, Fed policymakers
said that, until these uncertainties abate, they
will not be able to “usefully characterize” the
risks to the outlook.
Another explanation is that a recovery in
business investment is being hampered by a
capital “overhang.” According to this view, the
economy’s actual capital stock currently exceeds
its desired capital stock because of the invest-
ment boom of the late 1990s, which was perhaps
exacerbated by the euphoria in the stock market.
Some data support this argument: During the
record-long 1991-2001 expansion, real BFI
increased 113 percent and real GDP increased
by about 39 percent. In contrast, during the 1961-
69 expansion (the second-longest) real BFI
increased 95 percent and real GDP increased by
about 51 percent; and in the 1982-90 expansion
(the third-longest), real BFI increased 42 percent
and real GDP increased by about 37 percent.
The strongest rates of business capital spending during
the 1991-2001 expansion occurred toward its end. The
accompanying chart shows this by plotting the Federal
Reserve’s measure of manufacturing capacity and real
GDP since 1955. Economic theory says that growth of
output (real GDP) will be commensurate with the growth
of capital inputs and, by extension, capacity. From the first
quarter of 1955 to the first quarter of 1994, growth of
manufacturing capacity (3.4 percent per year) was nearly
identical to the growth of real GDP (3.3 percent per year).
Since 1994, however, growth of manufacturing capacity
(4.7 percent) has far outstripped growth of real GDP (3.1
percent). 
It is possible that the sharp declines in the prices of
capital goods (particularly high-tech goods) in recent years
have become more or less permanent, inducing firms to
permanently alter the mix of their capital-labor inputs. If
so, there might not be much of an overhang. But if an
overhang does exist, we would expect to see relatively
slow growth of real BFI until growth in output can create
demand for capital beyond the stock already in place. 
—Kevin L. Kliesen
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